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CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERING AT THE EDGE:
A LOOK BACK
Bruce A. Green*
"'Criminal defense lawyers play close to the line. Prosecutors
play in the center of the court.
"Refusal to violate professional ethics-or even to approach as
near to the line as humanly possible-is not professional
misconduct. "
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is an attempt to reconstruct the story of a New York
City lawyer's professional death and resurrection. In particular, this is
the story of John Palmieri's defense of John J. Delane in the year 1915, a
time in the history of the legal profession when the bounds of zealous
representation, particularly in criminal cases, were blurry and in
transition. This is also the story of what followed the Delane trial: the
efforts of prosecutorial, disciplinary, and judicial authorities to resolve
factual and legal uncertainties about Palmieri's conduct and intentions in
defending his client, their efforts to locate the line between a permissibly
zealous defense and an improperly overzealous one, and their efforts to
determine whether Palmieri's conduct fell out of bounds. And this is, of
course, an attempt to draw some lessons for today from the partially
reconstructed story of a criminal defense lawyer who advocated "at the
edge" (if not over it) close to a century ago.
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis Stein Center
for Law and Ethics. My thanks to Roy Simon for inviting me to participate in the symposium on
"Lawyering at the Edge," for which this Article was written.
1. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
617 (1999).
2. Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, 39 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
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The story's broad outlines are simple. Palmieri's client, John
Delane, is tried for receiving the proceeds of prostitution from one
Jeannette Annette, based principally on the testimony of two prostitutes
associated with her.3 Annette is not called to testify against Delane
because the prosecutor cannot find her. But in the middle of the defense
case, Annette makes an entrance, suitcase in hand. She says that she had
been living in upstate New York where no one knew how to reach her;
that she learned about Delane's trial from the previous day's newspaper;
and that she got on the train the night before, arrived in the city early that
morning, and, after wandering the streets, mustered up the courage to
come to the courthouse to set the record straight.4 Palmieri knows that
Annette is lying, both on direct-examination when she begins accounting
for her dramatic appearance and on cross-examination when she
elaborates, but he does not correct her, and in summation, he briefly
presents a small part of her account as true, knowing it to be false. For
doing so he becomes the target of both criminal and disciplinary
proceedings.5
The more detailed version that follows proceeds first, with some
background to the Delane trial, and then with the trial itself, the criminal
investigation and prosecution, and the disciplinary proceedings. The
story is based on the record of the disciplinary proceedings against
Palmieri (which includes the record of the Delane trial),6 the briefs, and
some contemporaneous newspaper accounts, as well as the judicial
decisions. Among other things, the story raises questions of ongoing
relevance about how lawyers should behave when it is unclear where the
lines are drawn or when someone may later perceive that the lawyer
crossed the line even if he did not. Equally, the story raises questions
about how courts, prosecutors, and disciplinary authorities should
regulate lawyers who act in these areas of uncertainty.
3. Transcript of Record at 9-10, 60-61, In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917)
[hereinafter Transcript of Record] (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
4. Id. at 10-11,26-27, 500-01.
5. Id. at 8-12, 28-29.
6. Transcript of Record, supra note 3.
7. A theme of this Article-the difficulty of knowing-was amply reflected in the act of
writing it. Time and again, inferences that I drew from the historical record were proven wrong as
more evidence was adduced. Thus, I call this simply "an attempt to reconstruct" Palmieri's story.
Additional evidence would likely raise many additional doubts about the story. As an example of
the difficulty in constructing this narrative: One of the main figures of Palmieri's story was
frequently referenced in accounts as either "John De Lane" or "John Delane." For ease of reference,
I have selected "Delane."
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II. BACKGROUND TO THE DELANE TRIAL
Palmieri's client, John Delane,8 was a minor Tammany politician9
and saloon keeper. 10 He had come to America from Italy as a teenager,
gone into business, and founded a political club named after himself.11 A
year-and-a-half before the trial, at age twenty-eight, Delane was shot by
two gunmen while entering the clubrooms of the John J. Delane
Association on Morris Avenue. 12 An account of the shooting noted that
Delane's leadership among naturalized and American-born Italian-
Americans had been established much earlier.13 Not until his arrest was
it revealed that Delane himself had never become a United States
citizen. 14
A Bronx grand jury charged Delane on several counts relating to
receiving the proceeds of prostitution, and Delane pled not guilty. 15
Referred to in the press as the "Bronx White Slave case,"' 16 this was the
state equivalent of a federal prosecution under the White-Slave Traffic
Act. 17 Congress passed that law, popularly known as the Mann Act, in
1910, to combat organized crime groups that were believed to be
kidnapping young women in Europe and selling them into sexual slavery
in America.' 8 The federal law was then used to prosecute cases,
including some celebrated ones, having little to do with that law's
original purpose. 19
8. Delane's true name was John De George. He was indicted as "John De George, alias John
De Lane." Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 313.
9. White Slave Plot to Free Politician Goes 'Higher Up', N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 15, 1915, at 8.
10. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 311.
11. Shoot Young Leader as He Enters Club, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1913, at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Palmieri Gives Bail on Two Indictments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1915, at 7 [hereinafter
Palmieri Gives Bail].
15. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 312.
16. See, e.g., Palmieri Gives Bail, supra note 14.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2000).
18. Id. See generally DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATIVE MORALITY
AND THE MANN ACT 15-47, 65-68 (John C. Fout ed., 1994) (providing background information to
the passage of the Mann Act and referencing legislative history showing that the intent of the Act
was to the stop trafficking of white women across state lines for prostitution); Anne M. Coughlin,
Of White Slaves and Domestic Hostages, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 109-13, 124 (1997) (stating
that the Mann Act was enacted to stop debauchery and commercial trafficking of women and
claiming that a United States Immigration Commission report regarding the kidnapping of European
women to be sex slaves in the United States played a "significant" role in the passage of the Act).
19. See generally LANGUM, supra note 18, at 48-76 (discussing various cases in which courts
have deviated from the main purposes of the Mann Act).
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Delane's indictment grew out of a federal investigation. After
securing the criminal convictions of two men, Antonio Ross and Joseph
Mirabella, in 1914, the federal authorities handed their witnesses over to
the Bronx District Attorney, Francis Martin.20 Martin used the witnesses'
testimony to secure separate indictments against Delane and another
defendant, Benjamin Sabbatino. 2' The local press followed Delane's
case.22
Palmieri entered the case shortly before the trial, which began on
the morning of March 9, 1915 with the selection of a jury. Although
Palmieri and Delane did not know each other, it was not surprising that
Delane sought Palmieri's help. It is true that Palmieri was not among the
ranks of the elite lawyers who populated the city's corporate law firms
and controlled its representative organization-the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, widely known as the City Bar. But the
elite lawyers did not defend criminal cases. Palmieri, on the other hand,
was well known among criminal defense lawyers and within the city's
Italian community, and, in his early forties, 23 he was at the height of his
professional career.24
Palmieri was born outside of Naples, Italy.25 His widowed mother
brought him as a child to New York City, where he grew up on the lower
east side of Manhattan, attending public schools, City College26 and law
20. See Palmieri Gives Bail, supra note 14.
21. See id.
22. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 131-36 (A New York City News Association
reporter who covered the case testified that there was not much attention paid to the case by the
downtown newspapers but that Delane "was pretty well known in the Bronx" and "was quite a
politician there.").
23. Compare Palmierifor City Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1904, at 14 (reporting Palmieri as
being forty years old in 1904) with John Palmieri, 64, A Former Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1937
at 17 (reporting Palmieri's age as sixty-four at his death in 1937).
24. See, e.g., Hearst Won't Run for Office Again, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1909, at 20
(identifying Palmieri as one of the guests of honor at a dinner honoring William Randolph Hearst).
A 1913 New York Times article suggests Palmieri's renown as a criminal defense lawyer. Charlton
Prepared Defense on Voyage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1913, at 4. The article concerns the arrival of
Porter Charlton, the son of a federal judge, in Italy after being extradited to face a criminal trial for
murdering his wife, placing her body in a trunk, and sinking it in Lake Como. Porter Charlton, Wife
Slayer, Here, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1916, at 22. The 1913 article refers to the effort of Charlton's
father to retain Palmieri, along with famous Italian advocates, to defend his son and notes that
Palmieri may have to decline the engagement in order to return to the United States to defend an
Italian accused of killing a New York policeman. Charlton Prepared Defense on Voyage, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1913, at4.
25. Palmieri for City Bench, supra note 23.
26. John Palmieri, 64, A Former Justice, supra note 23.
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school,27 and gaining admission to the bar in 1891.28 He established a
solo and, then, two-person law practice,29 in which he specialized in
defending members of the Italian immigrant community. Early in his
career, he also served briefly as a deputy attorney general in voting fraud
cases. 30 He ran unsuccessfully several times in the Bowery for the
Assembly and the Board of Aldermen on the Republican ticket,3I and
was generally engaged in progressive politics, opposed to Tammany's
control of city government and to the influence of big corporations. 32
In the late summer of 1904, based on the recommendations of
prominent judges and others,33 Governor Benjamin B. Odell, Jr.,
appointed Palmieri to the City Court to replace a recently deceased
Justice until an election could be held in November to fill the vacancy.34
Palmieri was later reported to be the first Italian-born citizen to become
a judge in the United States and his appointment was celebrated in his
community.35 Palmieri subsequently received the Republican nomination
for the judgeship, but he was regarded as unqualified by the City Bar,
and he was defeated for the position by the Democratic candidate, who
the bar association also declined to approve.36 Although Palmieri's
service as a judge lasted only a few months, he would be referred to as
Judge Palmieri or ex-Judge Palmieri throughout his later career.
Palmieri returned to law practice after leaving the bench. His most
sensational criminal representation was in the 1906 trial of seventeen
27. Palmieri's obituary lists him as attending New York University School of Law. Id. An
earlier article identified him as having attended the New York Law School. Palmierifor City Bench,
supra note 23. In the early or mid-1890s, before being admitted to the bar, Palmieri was an "office
boy" in the employ of a law firm, Connoly, Lewinson & Mack, and may in fact have read for the
bar. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 259.
28. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 138. The Appellate Division decision mistakenly
records his admission as 1901. In re Palmieri, 162 N.Y.S. 799, 800 (App. Div. 1916), rev'd, 117
N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917).
29. The firm, Palmieri & Wechsler, was located in the World Building in lower Manhattan.
Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 139. The earliest decision referring to the firm is in 1904, but
a 1900 decision reflects Palmieri's association with Martin Wechsler. See Stefanini v. Sroka, 88
N.Y.S. 167, 167 (App. Div. 1904); Gobbi v. Associazone Fraterna Itallianna, 65 N.Y.S. 672 (App.
Div. 1900).
30. See, e.g., People v. Acritelli, 110 N.Y.S. 430, 433, 438 (App. Div. 1908).
3 1. Palmieri for City Bench, supra note 23 (reporting that Palmieri ran twice as the
Republican nominee for Assembly and in 1903 for Alderman).
32. See, e.g., City Ownership League to Attend Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1905, at 4.
33. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 248.
34. Palmieri for City Bench, supra note 23.
35. John Palmieri, 64, A Former Justice, supra note 23.
36. Trounstine v. Britt, 106 N.E. 129, 130 (N.Y. 1914); Bar Association Acts on Judiciary,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1904, at 5.
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year-old Josephine Terranova for stabbing to death her sexually abusive
uncle and her aunt. 37 Palmieri's successful insanity defense was marked
by the clash of alienists and other medical experts.38
As Palmieri's criminal practice developed, the practice of law and
the regulation of lawyers in New York were in transition. Although the
state judiciary had always been responsible for admitting lawyers to the
bar, for a long time it had no effective way to police the lawyers it
admitted. At the end of the nineteenth century the state courts handed
responsibility to the recently-formed bar associations to investigate and
prosecute disciplinary charges. With the adoption of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1908 and their endorsement by the New York
State Bar Association the next year, the organized bar in New York had
an explicit (if not entirely clear) set of professional expectations on
which to premise disciplinary charges.39
Efforts to reform the bar mirrored broader public efforts to reform
state and local government, including the judiciary, and the City Bar was
involved in many of these efforts. The professional elite held state court
practitioners, particularly criminal practitioners, in low esteem, in part
because of corrupt trial lawyers whose stock-in-trade included suborning
perjury and hiding witnesses. For example, when Palmieri entered the
profession, William F. Howe of the Howe & Hummel law firm, once
one of the most successful and corrupt lawyers of the mid-to-late 1800s,
was a recent memory, and the law firm itself continued.4 ° Until the
organized bar stepped in, it was largely the job of criminal prosecutors to
police corruption among lawyers, but the corps of city prosecutors was
itself less than exemplary. Not until William Travers Jerome took office
as the Manhattan District Attorney in 1902 did the tradition of district
attorneys who were independent of the party bosses, police, and
powerful private citizens begin to take root in New York City.4'
37. This trial was resurrected from obscurity in a fascinating account of the case and its
significance by Jacob M. Appel. Jacob M. Appel, The Girl- Wife and the Alienists: The Forgotten
Murder Trial of Josephine Terranova, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 203, 205-09 (2004).
38. Id. at210-14.
39. Robert T. Begg, Revoking the LawyersLicense to Discriminate in New York: The Demise
ofa Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 283 (1993).
40. See RICHARD H. ROVERE, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND SCANDALOUS HISTORY
152-54 (1947); Molly A. Guptill, Note, The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same: Mr.
Tutt and the Distrust of Lawyers in the Early Twentieth Century, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 305, 313 (2004).
41. See generally RICHARD O'CONNOR, COURTROOM WARRIOR: THE COMBATIVE CAREER
OF WILLIAM TRAVERS JEROME (1963) (discussing the career of William Travers Jerome in the
District Attorney's office and the political circumstances of New York at the time); Allen Steinberg,
[Vol. 36:353
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At any time, criminal defense practitioners have to contend with
appearances of guilt by association with their clientele and run the risk
of being falsely accused of wrongdoing by clients who are trying to
better their own lot. Add to this that prevailing standards of the times
made such accusations all the more plausible, and to this, add the brass-
knuckles style of practice in New York City criminal courts of
Palmieri's day, and it becomes hard to imagine that any criminal defense
lawyer would avoid occasional run-ins and suspicions.
Certainly, Palmieri was not the exception. For example, in 1899, a
legislative investigation of Tammany government looked into dismissals
of murder cases in which an assistant district attorney's son and Palmieri
represented criminal defendants. Palmieri reportedly failed to show up to
42answer questions. In 1907, a year after the Terranova trial, Palmieri
figured peripherally in a political corruption scandal, when Aldermen in
a minority party (the Municipal Ownership League) who were expected
to support Palmieri for the position of Recorder took bribes to throw
their votes to another candidate.43 Palmieri also had the occasional
reported tussle with a fellow lawyer or judge.44
More seriously, Palmie:i's name figured in a 1911 murder trial as
an alleged accessory. The defendant, Romeo Magnotti, had escaped
from Staten Island to Italy in 1903 before he could be tried, and years
later, he returned to the United States, was captured in Ohio, and was
returned to face the music. 45 Magnotti testified that right after the
murder, Palmieri harbored him at his Manhattan home, helped him to
escape, and corresponded with him for the next five years. Palmieri
refused to testify on confidentiality grounds but acknowledged that
Magnotti had been to his house and that they had corresponded.46
Magnotti's allegations were little noticed initially but became an
issue a year later when the Bull Moose Party nominated Palmieri as its
The "Lawman" in New York: William Travers Jerome and the Origins of the Modern District
Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 753 (2003).
42. Mazet Committee's Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1899, at 14.
43. Two Aldermen Held in Bribery Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1907, at 3; see also
Alderman in Deadlock Over the Recordership, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1907, at 5.
44. See N.Y. ex rel. Palmieri v. Marean, 83 N.Y.S. 843, 843-44 (App. Div. 1903) (vacating a
fifty dollar contempt fine against Palmieri in a Manhattan civil trial for refusing to sit down when
the judge ordered him to do so); Lawyers in a Spat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1908, at 3 (describing a
verbal exchange in which Palmieri appeared ready to "come to blows" with another lawyer over the
question of which of them represented the defendant).




candidate for State Attorney General.47 A Brooklyn newspaper published
a transcript of Magnotti's testimony and the party commenced an
investigation.48 Palmieri charged that those who had resurrected the
story in an attempt to force him off the ticket were engaged in ethnic
bias.49 In his defense, Palmieri produced letters from the District
Attorney and from Magnotti's lawyer saying that Magnotti had lied and
that Palmieri had done nothing improper.50 The Bull Moose Party
committee appointed to investigate concluded that Palmieri had been
wrongly accused. l
Whatever attacks may have been leveled at Palmieri up to the date
of the Delane trial, he weathered them all.52 And even more than that, as
later events made clear, Palmieri was widely regarded as an honest
lawyer. When later obligated to answer disciplinary charges arising out
of the Delane trial, Palmieri presented testimonials to his good character
from almost fifty current and former judges and public officials,
including the former Governor and the district attorneys of four New
York City counties.53
III. THE DELANE TRIAL
According to Palmieri's later account, Delane's first lawyer,
William J. Kier,54 came to him a few days or weeks before the trial to
ask him to defend the case. 55 The matter of Palmieri's fee was not
resolved until the day before the trial,56 at which point Palmieri invited
Delane to his office on Park Row, near the lower Manhattan





51. Believe Roosevelt Is Losing Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1912, at 3.
52. See Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 139 (Palmieri testified that until the Delane
case, he had never been charged by a bar association or court).
53. Id. at 246-95.
54. Kier, who represented Delane when he answered the indictment in the case, had a prior
association with Delane. See infra note 96.
55. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 139-40. According to Palmieri, Kier told him "that
this case was considered in the Bronx as one of the most important cases to be tried." Id. at 140.
56. Id. at 142-43 (Palmieri initially quoted a $500 fee but Delane came up with only $200 and
Palmieri declined to proceed until the remainder was produced. Palmieri eventually relented for an
additional $50.).
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character witnesses and Palmieri considered that there was little else to
do, since the case was just a question of fact for the jury.57
Delane's alleged victim was one Jeannette Annette, also known as
Henrietta Annette, and later referred to by both sides in the Palmieri
disciplinary proceedings as "the Annette woman." 58 The Bronx District
Attorney, Francis Martin, planned to show that Delane and Annette had
been living in a succession of Bronx apartments for some years under
the names "John Annette and Jeannette Annette," while Delane's wife
lived in an apartment elsewhere in the Bronx, and that Annette supported
Delane, paying their rent with the proceeds from prostitution. The
prosecutor's office gave notice before the trial that the chief accusing
witnesses would be two other prostitutes who would testify that one
night, more than a year earlier, they saw Annette take a roll of dollar
bills from her stocking and give it to Delane. 59 Annette herself was not
scheduled to testify; she was absent from the trial. The District
Attorney's office had hidden her for a time but she had run off and the
prosecution could not find her. The District Attorney was unable to tie
her absence to Delane.
Delane denied receiving money from Annette and attributed the
prosecution to the elected District Attorney's political animosity.60
Delane said Annette would support his account and showed Palmieri
two signed statements from Annette attesting to Delane's innocence. 61
Delane said he knew where to find Annette. She had gone upstate to get
away from the District Attorney. Delane kept in touch with her and sent
her money. Palmieri directed Delane to telephone Annette and summon
her back to New York City.62
Annette came to Palmieri's Coney Island, Brooklyn home the next
morning, March 9, 1915, the first day of the trial. She came early
because Palmieri had to leave by 8:30 a.m. to be at the Bronx courthouse
when jury selection began at 10:00 a.m. 63 She was carrying her suitcase.
57. Id. at 47, 49.
58. Id. at 43, 45, 48-50, 82.
59. Id. at 82-83, 319-20, 324.
60. Id. at 141 (Palmieri testified that Kier told him that Delane headed a political association
with over 1000 members, "that there existed between him and Mr. Martin some political animosity,
and [that] he felt that this indictment was merely spite work on the part of Mr. Martin.").
61. Id. at 50-51. One of the statements denied giving money to Delane and said that if Annette
had made any contrary statements it was because the prosecutors "frightened [her] and [she] thought
they would send [her] to prison if [she] did not make the statements they wanted [her] to make." Id.
The other was to the same effect. Id.
62. Id. at 144.
63. Id. at 46-47.
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Supposedly, she had arrived early that morning on the overnight train
from Amsterdam, which was near Mayfield, the small upstate town
where she said she was rooming.64 Palmieri's housekeeper,65 Giovanna
Sanna, showed her into the library and brought her tea.
Annette was waiting when Palmieri entered his library at 7:30 a.m.
and they spoke briefly.66 Annette said she would testify that she had
never given Delane money from prostitution. Although Palmieri knew
that Annette had made a contrary statement to the Bronx prosecutor,
Annette denied that she had testified to the grand jury.6 7 Had he known
that she had, Palmieri later said, he would never have called Annette as a
witness.68
The prosecution's case took less than a day. District Attorney
Martin made an opening statement and then, as promised, called a
handful of witnesses. The star witnesses were two prostitutes, "comrades
or associates" of Annette, who testified that they saw Annette give
Delane money. One of them, Stella Brophy, said that for two years, she
and her own male friend (going by the name of Mr. and Mrs. Marble)
shared various Bronx apartments with Annette and Delane. 69 The other
prostitute, Margie Miller, stayed with them at the apartment for a short
while.70 The women testified that on January 10, 1914, a date more than
a year earlier, they went downtown to go "hustling," returned to the
Bronx around 1:00 a.m. the next morning, met Delane, and returned to
the apartment on East 153rd Street.71 After Jeannette changed into a
kimono, she returned to where the others were waiting, said, "I had a
good night," removed from her stocking a roll of bills with a $10 bill on
64. Id. at 46, 144; Appellant's Brief at 3, In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917)
[hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. It may well be that Annette was hiding out elsewhere, including in
New York City.
65. She was generally referred to as Palmieri's "servant" or "maid." See, e.g., Transcript of
Record, supra note 3, at 224.
66. Id.at47,55.
67. Id. at 53, 146, 195-96. Evidently, there was a requirement that the prosecutor disclose the
grand jury testimony that led to the defendant's indictment, at least once all of the indicted
defendants were apprehended. However, Delane had been separately indicted based on Annette's
testimony and that of the other prostitute-witnesses. The prosecutor proceeded only on the latter
charges. He did not feel obligated to disclose Annette's grand jury testimony, since Delane was not
being tried on the indictment to which it had led. Id. at 144-45; see also infra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
68. Brief for Respondent at 47, In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917) [hereinafte Brief
for Respondent].
69. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 320, 322-24.
70. Id. at 384.
71. Id. at 327-28,386-90.
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top, and gave the money to Delane, who observed, "I didn't think there
was so much money in the world., 72
Two janitresses and a landlord of the Bronx apartments testified
that Annette and Delane lived together as a married couple under the
name Annette.73 Two police detectives accounted for Annette's absence.
They testified that while Annette was staying in a Bronx apartment, she
went downstairs, had a whispered conversation with one Mrs. Mancini,
went off with her, and had not been seen since.74 One detective's attempt
to locate Annette took him on an odyssey through New York City and to
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Tennessee.7 5
After the prosecution rested, Palmieri made some motions and then
asked for an adjournment until the next day in order to decide whether to
present evidence.76 The judge, County Judge Gibbs, directed Palmieri to
give his opening statement that afternoon, and Palmieri gave a short one,
to the effect that Delane had no obligation to put on a defense and that,
although he had to consult with Delane, he was "prepared to try this case
upon the People's own showing. 77 Then the judge adjourned the trial as
requested.78
Palmieri's evident indecision whether to present a case was
probably all in show, since Delane had character witnesses lined up for
the next day. But it is plausible that Palmieri would have equivocated
over whether to call Annette as a witness. He was already in a position
to argue, as he later did in his closing statement, that the prosecution's
two accusing witnesses were not credible and that the prosecution had
not proven Delane's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Or as Palmieri,
interjecting his own credibility into the argument, would put it:
[T]hey are.., brazen hussies; if you want to know my opinion, I
wouldn't believe them under oath. If you want to know my opinion,
they would just as well swear the Judge's life away, or my life away,
as they would [Delane] ....
72. Id. at 329; see also id. at 388.
73. Id. at 363-64 (Louise Nessling, janitress), 366-67 (Anna Knipe, janitress), 378-79 (Adolph
Troeller, landlord).
74. Id. at 406-08.
75. Id. at 408.
76. Id. at 409-10.
77. Id. at 410-13; Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 1.
78. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 414-15.
2007]
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
No, no, gentlemen of the jury. God forbid that you can believe
those women. God forbid that you believe those brazen hussies.79
Of course, it would be good for the defense if Annette could
credibly testify that she never gave Delane money. But the jury might
discount or disregard her testimony, or even conclude the opposite, if it
learned that Delane sent her money while she hid from the District
Attorney and then summoned her back to the city for the trial, as
Palmieri knew to be the case.
Palmieri met briefly with Annette a second time at his home the
next morning, perhaps to test her credibility, perhaps to prepare her.8°
Their meeting could not have been long, since Palmieri again had to get
to the Bronx by 10:00 a.m. Palmieri did not bring Annette to court with
him; but by his account, he instructed her to go to court, where "she
would be required as a witness.'
Palmieri began the defense case later that morning by calling a
parade of character witnesses, primarily business people who knew
Delane from his saloon or from the John J. Delane Association, to attest
to Delane's reputation for morality, honesty, and fair dealings. 82 On
cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited one witness's opinion that
Delane's saloon, Gilligan's, also enjoyed a good reputation, which gave
the prosecutor an opening to note that he had once ordered the police to
close down the saloon.83 In order to provide an explanation, other than
the obvious one, for the absence of Delane's wife, Wilhelmina, from the
courtroom, Palmieri ended the morning by calling her physician to
testify that Wilhelmina was unwell.84
On the afternoon of the second trial day, Annette arrived in the
courtroom, as she had arrived at Palmieri's door a day-and-a-half earlier,
carrying a suitcase. Palmieri started his questioning with what might
have seemed like bland pleasantries, but they would become central to
the later disciplinary inquiry. He began, "Where do you live?" Annette
answered, "Now, I have no residence at all; I don't live anywhere just at
79. Id. at 583-84, 596. With regard to the political incorrectness of the term "brazen hussies,"
see Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds and Manners,
63 TENN. L. REv. 689, 706-07 (1996).
80. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 56-57 (Palmieri explained that he wanted to
question Annette about why, if she was telling the truth, Brophy and Miller "had sworn the day
before that they had seen her actually give money to Delane.").
81. Id. at 57.
82. See id at 415-64.
83. Id. at 452.
84. Id. at 464-74.
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present., 85 Evidently referring to the suitcase, Palmieri continued, "What
did you have in your hand when you came in here? '86 The prosecutor's
objection was sustained. Palmieri went on, "Where did you come from,
Miss Annette?" Answer: "Why, I just came from Mayfield, New
York., 87 Question: "Where is Mayfield, New York?" Answer: "It is up
the State; just how far it is, I couldn't tell you. '88 Question: "Is it near
any great city?" Answer: "I don't know that; I couldn't tell you., 89
And then came the seemingly innocuous, but fateful, question:
"How did you get from Mayfield to New York?" And Annette's answer:
"Why, I came down on the New York Central & Hudson River; I came
down on the train last night"-a lie. "I came down here," she continued,
"because I read in the paper that Mr. De Lane's case"9° -the start of
another lie, at which point Annette's testimony was interrupted by an
objection from the prosecutor: "I submit, your Honor, the witness be told
to answer questions." The trial judge sustained the objection; the
question was repeated, "How did you get from Mayfield to New York?"
Annette answered, "I came down on the train' 91 and then the direct
examination moved on to the essential aspects of her direct testimony:
that she had been a professional prostitute ("a sporting woman"),
beginning six or seven years earlier, nearly two years before she met
Delane; and that she never supported Delane: "I didn't give him any
money at all" she insisted, "never at no time did I ever give him
money., 92 She refuted the testimony of Brophy and Miller that she gave
Delane a roll of bills from her stocking, calling their account "a lie. 93
Palmieri closed by asking about Annette's dealings with the
prosecutor. She answered that Martin yelled at her, threatened her with
jail, and tried to get her to change her story. Palmieri asked whether
Annette told the prosecutor that Delane never gave her money, and she
replied expansively:
I told him that, but he knew different; he knew lots of things and he
had so many witnesses. Where are your witnesses? Bring them in and
let them talk to me ... they never seen nothing. Why don't you bring
85. Id. at 474.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 475.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 476-78.
93. Id. at 478-79.
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them in and let me talk to them? That is why I came here
today..4 nobody knew where I was to bring me here, but I came
anyway.
Again, a lie. But Palmieri did not correct it. He passed the witness to the
prosecutor.
It is easy to understand why Annette lied-namely, to shield
Delane from damaging inferences from the fact that he had sent her
money while she was hiding from the prosecutor. But it is impossible to
know whether Palmieri played a role in scripting her lies and
orchestrating her charade. The answer turns, to a large extent, on
Palmieri's conversations with Annette and Delane, and of these, there is
no reliable record and never was.
What is plain from the record is that Annette's participation did not
help Delane. Having learned at some point that Palmieri would call
Annette as a witness, 95 the prosecutor had armed himself with a
transcript of her prior sworn grand jury testimony in which she admitted
hustling for Delane.96 Annette's explanation for implicating Delane
under oath in the grand jury proceeding was that she had been afraid of
the prosecutor.97 Later, in the disciplinary proceedings, Palmieri's
counsel would complain about the prosecutor's unseemly failure to warn
Palmieri of the existence of the grand jury testimony before Palmieri
called her to the stand: "[F]or the District Attorney to have led Mr.
Palmieri into the trap of putting the Annette woman on the stand without
telling him that she had been a witness before the Grand Jury was a
breach of propriety, or at least of etiquette . ,,98
When cross-examined about how she came to be testifying at
Delane's trial, Annette stuck to her previous story. 99 She brought out a
clipping of a news story from the previous afternoon's Evening Journal,
which, she said, had moved her to pack and catch the 11:09 p.m. train
94. Id. at 479-80 (emphasis added).
95. Whether Palmieri disclosed his intent to call Annette as a witness shortly before he did so
or the previous evening was to become one of the few disputed facts in Palmieri's disciplinary
hearing. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text. What seems certain is that, had he not
decided to call Annette as a witness, Palmieri had no intention of disclosing her whereabouts to the
prosecution, despite her obvious importance.
96. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 480-82. On cross-examination, Annette
acknowledged that Delane had hired her a lawyer (whom Annette paid) when she was arrested for
hustling. The lawyer, Kier, was the same one who Delane originally hired to defend him on the
white slavery charges. Id. at 140, 493-95.
97. Id. at 482-83.
98. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 28.
99. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 495-512.
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from Amsterdam, New York the night before, arriving that very morning
at 5:05 a.m.'00 The prosecutor questioned her effectively about how she
had spent the time from then until her appearance in court. The
prosecutor's questioning took over an hour, and the judge followed up,
as Annette recounted carrying her suitcase up and down the city for
hours that morning.101 The prosecutor drew out obvious lies, as Annette
was unable to account plausibly for her whereabouts, although he did not
elicit the whole truth-that she had arrived (at least) two days earlier in
response to Delane's call. To put another nail in the coffin, the
prosecutor later called, as one of his rebuttal witnesses, the proprietor,
Mr. Griswold, of the Mayfield Hotel in Mayfield where Annette said she
had been rooming, to testify that Annette had not departed the night
before, as she claimed, but had not been seen for some time.10 2 Palmieri
cross-examined Griswold to suggest that he might have been in error.
There was no love lost between Palmieri and District Attorney
Martin; they had sparred throughout the case. 10 3 Palmieri felt he had
been sandbagged by the District Attorney's failure to disclose that
Annette had testified to the grand jury. Palmieri sought to put the
prosecutor's conduct on trial, and in conclusion, called Martin as a
surrebuttal witness. The trial judge expressed some doubts about the
propriety of his doing so and warned Palmieri that he might be opening
the door to prejudicial testimony. 0 4 The court then sustained objections
to a line of questions designed to show that Martin had violated a law
requiring the prosecutor to endorse the names of grand jury witnesses on
the back of indictments, but allowed Martin to answer why Annette's
name did not appear on the indictment. 10 5 Martin's answer, in a nutshell,
was that he had initially indicted Delane based on Annette's testimony,
but that after Annette disappeared, he secured the new indictment on
100. Id. at499-501,511.
101. Id. at 501-09. Palmieri later estimated that the prosecutor spent an hour and a half
questioning Annette and that the judge added another forty-five minutes of questioning. Id. at 171.
102. Id. at 544-46. During his testimony, the proprietor referred to Annette as "Miller," the
pseudonym Annette was using at the time. Id. at 549. The prosecution also called, as rebuttal
witnesses, two federal agents who had brought Annette to the District Attorney's office the previous
October, but they were not permitted to testify concerning Annette's statements, as the prosecutor
planned. Id. at 558-62.
103. In summation, Palmieri took various swipes at Martin, observing that his treatment by the
prosecutor "has been such as to discourage me to come into this court again." Id. at 594. Palmieri
told the jury, "[a] public prosecutor must not be a persecutor." Id. at 599. The prosecutor responded
in kind. Id. at 601-02; see also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
104. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 563.
105. Id. at 563-64.
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which Delane was tried, based on the testimony of Annette's
acquaintances. Along the way, Martin managed to slip in that Delane
"had been her pimp for four years," and that when Annette was "spirited
away," the prosecutor "proceeded to do the very best [he] could... to
rid the county of one of the worst characters which [he] thought ever
lived in this county."' 06 Ultimately, the derogatory remarks were stricken
by the trial judge, with the unsympathetic observation that if Delane was
nevertheless prejudiced, "[he] brought it down upon himself by his
counsel."' 10 7
At the close of evidence, Palmieri offered to forgo summation,10 8
explaining (in the jury's presence and, no doubt, for dramatic effect) that
"this case is not even worthy of summation after the action of the
District Attorney in this case."' 0 9 Perhaps this reflected Palmieri's sense
of the fitility or difficulty of summing up, but that seems unlikely.
Certainly, the judge regarded the remark as contemptuous and insisted
on closing arguments, observing that "[e]very case where the rights of
the defendant are at stake ... is worthy of the best efforts, of the best
eloquence of the best advocate."' 110 And ultimately, Palmieri asked for
twenty to thirty minutes for his remarks.
Palmieri's principal theme was, do not believe any of them-not
Annette, but also not the prosecution's two accusing witnesses-they are
all "brazen hussies."'11 He argued that the witnesses' stories of seeing
Annette hand Delane a roll of bills was implausible, as was their claim
to have both been present when it happened, and both to have
remembered it in the same way, but not to have discussed the case
during the months leading up to the trial when the District Attorney was
hiding them together in a flat.1 2 This trial, Palmieri argued, was just "a
fight between prostitutes.""' 3 Delane was simply a customer, and while
that was wrongful, he was not being prosecuted for that.' 14
And further, Palmieri argued, you can tell by looking at Annette
that she was not a woman to be meekly exploited by a man like Delane:
106. Id. at 564-65.
107. Id. at 569-70.
108. Id. at 570.
109. Id. at 571.
110. Id.
111. Id, at 583-84, 596.
112. Id, at 581-82, 589.
113. Id at 582.
114. Id, at 584.
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This woman is no white slave in the sense that you and I understand
white slaves to be. Do you believe, gentlemen of the jury, that that
brazen hussy would have ever given away a dollar. You try to get a
dollar from her and see if you can do it. You try it. Does she look like
the kind of a woman that would take a roll of bills from her stocking
and give it to him? Does she? Not that woman. No.
115
And then, by Palmieri's own later admission, his rhetoric carried
him over the edge. He continued:
It would be a different case here if you had an innocent,
unsuspecting little girl without any experience ... of the world .... It
would be entirely a different thing, entirely different matter, but we
have got her here, and thank God, gentlemen of the jury, that Divine
Providence has brought that woman here. If it was the Evening
Journal, I thank the Evening Journal. If it was anybody else-she said
it was the Evening Journal that she read it in, and by the way, she
produced a clipping to the Judge, if I am not mistaken; isn't that right,
Judge? 1
16
The judge answered, "Yes," and Palmieri concluded, "Thank God, I
say, to the press."''1 7 Of course, it had not been Divine Providence or the
Evening Journal that brought Annette to court, as Palmieri well knew.
The jury was not moved by Palmieri's argument, not even enough
to form a reasonable doubt. A few days later, the trial judge imposed a
ten- to twenty-year prison term. 18 Delane was shipped up to Sing Sing
prison to begin serving his sentence.
IV. THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
Moments after Annette left the courtroom, she was arrested for
perjury," 9 and Bronx District Attorney Francis Martin soon began
investigating who may have helped her to hide from the prosecution and
testify falsely on Delane's behalf. He established that the newspaper
clipping that she had brought to court, the supposed impetus for her
return from Mayfield to New York City, was from an afternoon edition




118. Id. at 642. The sentence was subsequently modified to "not less than ten years, and the
maximum not more than nineteen years and five months, so as to make your maximum term expire
in the summer instead of the winter." Id. at 643.
119. White Slave Plot to Free Politician Goes 'Higher Up', supra note 9.
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held on $25,000 bail. 20 Then Martin set out to secure her cooperation.
He obviously was not interested primarily in Delane's role-Delane
would soon begin serving a hefty sentence. Martin wanted to know who
helped Dekne-the bigger the fish, the better. There is, of course, no
record of what the prosecutors told Annette's court-appointed lawyer to
secure his client's cooperation, but no doubt, they pointed out that
perjury convictions would be easy to procure.
Not everyone accepted the verdict, with its implicit repudiation of
Annette's story. On March 24th, the former Coroner of the Bronx, a
political foe of the District Attorney, brought charges before the
Governor seeking Martin's removal.'12 Among other things, he alleged
that Martin had suborned the perjury of one "Henrietta Annette." Martin
called the accusations a "joke" and said they were a response to hostility
incurred in the course of prosecuting "white slavers.' 22 Evidently,
lawyers of that day were not inhibited from using the media as a
battleground.
Annette agreed to cooperate again with the prosecutors and signed a
statement giving her account of how she came to lie at Delane's trial.
She recalled being brought to Amsterdam, New York by a woman
named Kitty Manzini in one newspaper account, and Mary Bull in
another, to keep her from testifying against Delane after he was
indicted. 123 The District Attorney, presumably relying on Annette's
signed statement, told the New York Times that William Duer and his
wife harbored her on her return and that Tony Fisher accompanied her to
and from Palmieri's home on Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn. 124 Annette also
stated that she remembered being served tea by Palmieri's housekeeper,
who overheard some of their conversation. She claimed that Palmieri
instructed her to lie and gave her the newspaper clipping. 12 5
Would District Attorney Martin have been reluctant to take a
prostitute's word against a member of the bar? His summation to the
Delane jury suggests, to the contrary, that he was happy to believe the
worst of Palmieri. Martin had told the jury:
120. Palmieri Gives Bail, supra note 14.
121. Seeks Removal of Martin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1915, at 6.
122. Id.
123. See Palmieri Gives Bail, supra note 14 (noting that Kitty Manzini was indicted for her
part in the conspiracy-taking Annette to Amsterdam, New York); Writ Fails to Find Martin
Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1915, at 16 (noting that Mary Bull was held for her part in the
conspiracy-taking Annette to Amsterdam, New York).
124. Writ Fails to Find Martin Witnesses, supra note 123.
125. White Slave Plot to Free Politician Goes 'Higher Up', supra note 9.
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[M]y opponent in this case has done what a lawyer of his kind
generally does, who is familiar with the criminal law. He has lived a
life in it; he has spent his whole life about the criminal courts, and with
his familiarity of the criminal law, he has used the tactics of the
criminal lawyer when he has no case, to get up and abuse his opponent
no matter what that opponent may be .... [W]hile I have tried
hundreds of cases, I have never seen one where such an utter disregard
for Court and opponent was shown, as my opponent has shown in this
case, but I say his custom of work in the criminal courts may have led
him into that; it is something that I have never been used to, and I hope
something that I never shall be used to. As prosecutor of this county, I
have had to accept his abuse, and his insinuations from the
beginning. ... I have been elected by the people of this county to
prosecute crime, and while God gives me strength to do it, I will do it
to the best of my ability, and no man will ever question my motives,
and no man ever has questioned my motives to this time, and I will
stake my reputation against Judge Palmieri's, gentlemen. 126
Even so, the District Attorney needed to corroborate Annette's
account. He could hardly expect a jury to believe her word over
Palmieri's, though he might. So on Tuesday, April 13th, an assistant
district attorney, two detectives, and a fourth man (a deputy sheriff or
translator) accompanied Annette to Palmieri's house while he and his
wife were out. Annette pointed out Giovanna Sanna, Palmieri's
housekeeper, who was taken away, brought to court, and ordered held on
$1000 bail. 127
The next day, April 14th, Giovanna Sanna told the grand jury that
Annette had visited Palmieri's home before she testified. 128 Evidently
satisfied that this adequately corroborated Annette's testimony, the
Bronx District Attorney asked the judge to remove Annette's case
indefinitely from the trial calendar and to discharge her attorney. He
released Annette's statement and predicted that several well-known
people would be indicted. 129
Palmieri responded in the same forum. He called Annette's
statement "a deliberate fabrication and a lie," and fumed that Martin's
conduct "merits not only the severe condemnation, but the attention of
126. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 601-02.
127. Accuses Palmieri in Big Perjury Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1915, at 22.
128. White Slave Plot to Free Politician Goes 'Higher Up', supra note 9 (The article refers to
Palmieri's housekeeper as "Giovanna Sianna.").
129. Id.
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competent authorities."13 0 The New York Times noted that Palmieri
reserved his greatest outrage for how the prosecution treated his
housekeeper, describing how a prosecutor and police had come to his
home when only his employees and children were there, ordered one of
his housekeepers to dress and threatened her with handcuffs if she did
not come with them but never told her why, threatened the others not to
tell Palmieri, his wife, or neighbors what had occurred, left his children
in hysterics and left the others believing that Giovanna had been
kidnapped. 13 1 Palmieri concluded: "[a] more unwarranted and high-
handed proceeding has never been witnessed. It was absolutely illegal
from start to finish. If it had been indulged in by any but alleged officers
of the law it would have promptly resulted in the arrest of those
involved."'3 2
Two days later, on April 16th, District Attorney Martin's alleged
use of abduction as an investigative tool became the subject of another
proceeding. 3 3 The lawyer for the Duers, who were accused of harboring
Annette, charged that the prosecutor had summoned the couple on
Wednesday to testify "forthwith" before a grand jury that, as it turned
out, was not sitting, and then tried to question them-an apparent abuse
of the grand jury process. 134 When the Duers refused to answer, the
prosecutor ordered them to return the next day, which they did. "They
have not been seen since they entered the Grand Jury room," the Duers's
lawyer told the judge, and he asked the prosecutor to account for their
whereabouts.' 35 The Assistant District Attorney insisted, "we haven't got
'em.' ' 136 But later that same day, the Duers's attorney returned to court to
announce that a detective had admitted holding the couple on District
Attorney Martin's order. Justice Brady issued a writ of habeas corpus
directed at the District Attorney and instructed the Duers's lawyer to
seek a warrant in the Morrisania Court. 13 7
130. Accuses Palmieri in Big Perjury Plot, supra note 127.
131. Id. At Palmieri's disciplinary hearing, the Assistant District Attorney, Seymour Mork,
testified that he went to Palmieri's house with two detectives, Annette, and an Italian interpreter,
served Sanna "with a forthwith subpoena to appear before the Grand Jury, and so she would have no
trouble finding it I took her in the car." Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 222-24.
132. Accuses Palmieri in Big Perjury Plot, supra note 127.
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By that point, according to the New York Times account,
"[p]ractically every lawyer and politician in the Bronx has been
interested in the case."' 138 The next day, April 17th, Palmieri appeared
before a Magistrate in the Morrisania court to complain that District
Attorney Martin should stop trying his case in the press and that if he
planned to charge Palmieri, he should do so already. The judge noted
that the prosecutor did appear to be abusing judicial process and agreed
to take the matter under advisement.139
Four days later, on April 21st, the prosecutor obliged. Based on
Annette's testimony, a Bronx grand jury charged Palmieri in two
separate indictments, one for suborning perjury and the other for
conspiring to obstruct justice. 140 Palmieri took the charges seriously
enough to come to the Bronx County Court to answer them accompanied
by not only his wife but also the renowned criminal defense lawyer Max
D. Steuer, one of the most skilled and successful trial lawyers of the
day. 141 Justice Brady released Palmieri on $7500 bail, secured by a
surety bond. 142 The next day, Palmieri's housekeeper, Giovanna Sanna,
was indicted for perjury-apparently for testifying in the grand jury
inconsistently with whatever statement she had previously given to the
138. Id.
139. See To Summon Palmieri in Perjury Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1915, at 14.
140. See Palmieri Gives Bail, supra note 14.
141. Id. Steuer is still remembered for his successful defense in the homicide prosecutions
arising out of the fatal Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire. See DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE
FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 219-58 (2003). His cross-examination of the key prosecution
witness has been immortalized in Francis Wellman's classic, The Art of Cross-Examination.
FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 50 (GARDEN CITY BOOKS 1948) (1903).
Steuer was himself a subject of a disciplinary complaint and accusation of criminal misconduct a
few years before he took on Palmieri's defense. Max D. Steuer Denies Erlanger Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1912, at 3. Years later, the social and economic elite turned to Steuer when it was in
trouble, but that is not to say that he won its acceptance. A 1933 Time article about Steuer's
retention by J.P. Morgan's son to defend him on tax evasion charges suggests the ethnic biases of
the time:
To extricate himself from such a simple episode. [sic] Banker Mitchell had need of no
ordinary lawyer. He had already advised with such famed firms as Cravath, Degers-
dorff, Swaine & Wood and Davis. Polk. [sic] Wardell [sic], Gardiner & Reed. But even
the most high-powered Manhattan legal talent agreed that there was only one thing to do:
get slick little Crook-Defender Max D. Steuer, "greatest trial lawyer of our time." A
brilliant, inconspicuous, hawk-faced Austrian Jew, Max Steuer has defended George
Graham Rice, tireless stock swindler; Maurice Connolly, Queens sewer grafter. Harry
Daugherty, boss of the Ohio Gang: Max ("Boo Boo") Hoff, Philadelphia underworld
chief. He is the profession's ablest exponent of the old legal saw for a weak case: "Try
the judge, try your opponent, try the police but don't try your client."
Bona Fides, TIME, Apr. 3, 1933, available at www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,753619,00.html.
142. Palmieri Gives Bail, supra note 14.
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prosecutor.43 Taking the offensive, Palmieri told the court that Sanna
had been indicted only to discredit her as a witness in the criminal
proceeding that he was thinking of bringing against the Bronx District
Attorney. 144
After Palmieri answered the criminal charges, the Bronx prosecutor
refused to disclose the conspiracy indictment or the grand jury testimony
on which it was based, ostensibly because not all of the co-conspirators
had been apprehended. Over the next three months, litigation ensued
over whether Palmieri was entitled to examine the grand jury minutes in
order to assist him in seeking to dismiss the indictments. Justice Brady
granted Palmieri's motion, and, in June, the intermediate appellate court
agreed. 145 Two days later, the District Attorney's office asked Justice
Brady for permission to reopen the argument. It was reported that Steuer
responded by accusing District Attorney Martin "of using threats and
vilification to delay the court's proceedings."'' 46 Steuer complained:
Any time the District Attorney makes up his mind to ruin a man he
will indict him with forty-nine others and then fail to apprehend one of
the forty-nine .... He cares not whom he ruins. The District Attorney
acts in anything but a professional and ethical manner, but who in the
County of the Bronx can be so mighty as the District Attorney? 147
Some time after, in the first of two somewhat anticlimactic events
in this story, the charges against Palmieri were dismissed 14  as were
those against his housekeeper. 149 But District Attorney Martin then filed
disciplinary charges against Palmieri, 50 thus shifting the focus from the
143. Indicts Palmieri Servant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1915, at 20. According to Assistant
District Attorney Mork's later testimony, his office had subpoenaed her before a second grand jury
"and already she had shown dangerous symptoms of having been coached; she declined to answer
questions.., and she made misstatements," whereupon she was indicted for perjury and held on
$7500 bail. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 224-25.
144. Indicts Palmieri Servant, supra note 143.
145. People ex rel. Martin v. Brady, 153 N.Y.S. 893, 894 (App. Div. 1915); Palmieri Gains a
Point, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1915, at 20.
146. Raps District Attorney, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1915, at 9.
147. Id.
148. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 228.
149. According to Assistant District Attorney Mork, a decision was made not to try Sanna
because her testimony had become unnecessary once Palmieri admitted having met with Annette at
his home. Id. at 224-26. Annette eventually pleaded guilty to attempted burglary as a less serious
offense, albeit one that she probably had not committed. She received a suspended sentence, and
was recommitted to the county jail as a material witness in the prosecutor's case against Macini and
others. Id. at 227-28.
150. Id. at 186-87; Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 5.
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criminal to the disciplinary setting. The counter-charges against District
Attorney Martin, however, went nowhere, and he emerged none the
worse-for-wear. He continued as District Attorney (not without
controversy' 51) until the end of 1920 when he was elected to the state
Supreme Court, a trial level court of general jurisdiction. 152
V. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND THEIR AFTERMATH
Responsibility for the City Bar's disciplinary inquiry fell to its
grievance committee. Einar Chrystie had served as counsel to the
committee since 1902,'13 but the full committee examined Palmieri,
interjecting with questions whenever its members saw fit.' 54 Palmieri,
with Steuer still beside him, admitted directing Delane to summon
Annette to New York and meeting with her the day before she testified.
But he denied putting her up to lie. On the contrary, he testified that his
original plan was to elicit Annette's testimony that she had run away
from the prosecutor, had been in communication with Delane, who
supported her in hiding, and had been called back by Delane.155 Palmieri
denied that any of his questions were designed to elicit or bolster
Annette's false testimony, and while he conceded knowing that some of
her testimony was false, he said he believed that his duties to Delane
foreclosed him from correcting her. Unpersuaded, the grievance
committee voted to bring charges against Palmieri.156
The court assigned the case to a referee, Judge Freedman.1 57 The
City Bar was represented by Thomas D. Thacher, whose father, the
founder of Simpson, Thacher & Barnum (now known as Simpson,
Thacher & Bartlett), had been a member of the City Bar committee that
had disapproved of Palmieri's judicial candidacy more than a decade
151. See, e.g., Gibbs and Martin Quarrel in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1920, at 6.
152. Martin eventually became Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division, First Department in
1935 and served in that position until he died in 1947. See Francis Martin, Jurist, Dies at 68, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1947, at 25.
153. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1870-1970, at 365 (1970).
154. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 54-55, 57 (questions by Chrystie, Sprague, Ottinger,
Choate, and Davis); id. at 190 (Palmieri testified: "There were nine cross-examiners [in the
grievance committee] ... and I was there to satisfy them all, if I could. One man would ask a
question, and then immediately another and another . .
155. Id. at 57, 169, 194-95.
156. Id. at9, 17, 29, 201.
157. Id. at 4.
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before.158 Thacher relied primarily on Palmieri's deposition and the trial
transcript, but also called as witnesses Assistant District Attorney Mork,
Judge Gibbs, and others involved in the Delane trial. 159
Although Thacher believed that Palmieri had helped engineer
Annette's false trial testimony, he was not going to call her as a witness
to prove it.160 Therefore, he presented narrowly crafted charges. His
theory was that regardless of whether or not Palmieri had deliberately
elicited Annette's lies, Palmieri had failed to correct Annette's lies on
both direct and cross-examination, and his summation referred to a
portion of Annette's false testimony. This in itself, Thacher argued, was
serious misconduct. 16  At the same time, Thacher would have been
happy for the referee to infer that Palmieri's conduct had been far more
culpable.
Palmieri, now represented by Howard Taylor, 162 sought to dispel
any inference that he had intended to elicit Annette's false story in her
direct examination. He offered innocent explanations for the questions
about her whereabouts and her suitcase that had prompted the beginning
of her false tale. 163 He also sought to rebut any inference that he had
counseled Annette to lie, and this led to the only significant factual
dispute. Palmieri claimed that he told court officials and reporters after
court adjourned on the first day that he would call Annette as a
witness. 164 A reporter corroborated this account. 165 If this was true, it
would be unimaginable that Palmieri would coach Annette to pretendthat she did not decide until after the first trial day to come to the trial
158. See id. at 5; Bar Association Acts on Judiciary, supra note 36 (listing Thacher as a
member of the City Bar Council); Christopher Gray, A Remnant of a Midtown Full of Homes, Not
Offices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, at 7 (listing Thacher as one of the original founders of Simpson,
Thacher & Barnum, now Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett).
159. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 199-205 (cross examination of Palmieri
by Thacher with numerous references to trial transcript); see also id. at 209-12 (Thacher's direct
examination of Assistant District Attorney Mork); id. at 229-31 (Thacher's direct examination of
Judge Gibbs).
160. Annette was available, however, being held in jail as a material witness by the Bronx
District Attorney, and compensated $1 a day by the state. Id. at 227-28.
161. Respondent's Points at 1, 19-20, In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917) [hereinafter
Respondent's Points].
162. Among other things, Taylor had represented the City Bar in obtaining the disbarment of a
clerk of the Howe & Hummel firm for improperly practicing under the firm's name after the one
name partner was dead and the other disbarred. In re Kaffenburgh, 80 N.E. 570, 570-71 (N.Y.
1907).
163. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 168-71.
164. Id. at 163-65. Palmieri had previously so testified in the grievance committee proceedings.
Id. at 243.
165. Id. at 131-38.
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and that no one knew she was coming. 66 In rebuttal, the City Bar called
Assistant District Attorney Mork, who had assisted Martin in the trial,
and Judge Gibbs, the trial judge, both of whom testified that they did not
learn that Annette would testify until the following day.' 67 The only
possible reason for calling the rebuttal witnesses was to preserve the
argument that Palmieri knew in advance that Annette intended to lie
about when she had arrived in New York City.
Palmieri conceded that he had gotten carried away in his long
summation, but viewed this as a minor dereliction. 68 As to his failure to
correct Annette's perjury, he maintained that his duty to his client,
Delane, precluded him from doing so. Even if he was wrong about that,
he argued, it was only a question of "very nice professional ethics about
which opinions might differ, but a question which certainly does not
involve anything that might subject [him] to professional
condemnation."' 169 Judge Freedman disagreed. He issued a lengthy report
adopting the City Bar's version of the facts and concluding that Palmieri
had engaged in gross professional misconduct.' 70 The matter was then
referred to the intermediate appellate court.
The City Bar's argument in court was essentially the same one that
the referee had previously adopted. In response, Palmieri, still
represented by Taylor, again denied that his motive and intent were to
assist Annette in her perjury, and he denied that his failure to correct her
false testimony was misconduct. Palmieri argued that he "went to the
utmost extent that he ought to have gone, and that was consistent with
166. Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 17.
[A]t least as early as the noon recess on the 9th [Palmieri] informed the court officials
that he intended to call Annette. That fact conclusively disproves the improper motive
which is sought to be attributed to him in asking Annette, after her first unexpected
answer, what she had in her hand. That question could not possible [sic] have been asked
for the purpose of making it appear that she had come straight from the train, and
without his knowledge, when he himself had given notice some time in advance of her
appearance that he expected her.
Id.
167. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 211 (testimony of Assistant District Attorney Mork
stating that he did not learn until after the lunch break on the 10th that Annette would testify, only
shortly before she was called to the stand); id. at 229-31 (testimony of Judge Gibbs stating that he
was not told until after lunch on the last day of the trial).
168. Id. at 179-80 (Palmieri testified, "it was not a very happy expression for me to have
chosen, and I should have chosen a more appropriate expression [than Divine Providence], but it
was in the heat of a trial."); Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 26, 45-46.
169. Brief for Petitioner at 20, In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917) (quoting Palmieri's
counsel's argument to the Referee).
170. Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 22-30.
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his duties to his client, in asserting on the summing up that he would not
believe the Annette woman on oath.",17' He stressed that he had not
asked the jury to credit Annette172 but to find none of the prostitutes
credible, and that his reference to Annette's false testimony about
reading of the trial in the Evening Journal, although unfortunate, was
just "a passing phrase in the heat of summing up" while his mind and the
thrust of his argument were on other things.173 Palmieri's brief also
called attention to the prosecutor's "unfair and un-lawyerlike" conduct
of the trial, including his failure to warn Palmieri about Annette's grand
jury testimony. 7
4
. Palmieri's brief distinguished the disciplinary cases cited by the
grievance committee and the referee, which had involved lawyers'
deliberate misconduct in the representation of personal-injury plaintiffs
for a contingent fee. He argued that in any event, criminal and civil
representations are not analogous. The personal injury lawyer who keeps
silent in the face of perjury has a financial motive to do so. Plus,
Palmieri argued, the personal injury lawyer has "an easy way to extricate
himself from an embarrassing situation" by moving for a mistrial, to
which the judge in the middle of criminal trial would not agree.' 75 In a
criminal trial, Palmieri argued, any lawyer might have taken the view
"that it was not for him to assert affirmatively the facts about the
woman's coming to Court, lest that have an influence upon the decision
of the Jury which might have been disastrous for the defendant, and yet
the defendant be an innocent man."'176
Further, Palmieri pointed out that understandings about ethics were
changing and that, at the time of the Delane trial, whether a criminal
defense lawyer must correct a witness's false testimony on an issue not
central to the case was "a decidedly debatable question, and one upon
171. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 49.
172. Id. at 24-25. This was largely, but not entirely, true. Palmieri's summation did refer to
Annette's testimony that she never gave Delane money, although he did not dwell on this.
Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 589. As Palmieri's brief explained: "All through respondent's
summing up he was endeavoring in a most lawyerlike way to accredit the woman's story, on the
main issue, and still without accrediting the woman." Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 23.
173. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 26 ("It was a passing phrase in the heat of
summing up. His mind, at the moment he spoke, was centered upon the thought that a woman of the
physique and manner of the witness Annette was not the kind of a woman who would be the victim
of a white slaver, and his mind was centered upon the thought that he was thankful that she was
there in Court so that the jury could have a look at her.") (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 27-28.
175. Id. at 49.
176. ld.at50-51.
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which many lawyers would readily differ.' 77 He noted that many
lawyers, though not all, still adhered to Lord Brougham's famous dictum
that the lawyer's sacred duty to protect his client "by all means and
expedients" regardless of the costs to others or himself "is the highest
and most unquestioned of his duties."' 78 It was not fair to resolve
debatable questions by punishing a lawyer for conduct occurring before
the Court authoritatively resolved these questions and gave notice to the
bar. He concluded:
[I]n considering the questions that we are here debating, one
characteristic must be bome in mind that is bred in the bone and sinew
of the lawyer at the American Bar, and that is that in the criminal trials
throughout this country the play goes back and forth, with a desire on
the part of the District Attorney to convict, and on the part of the
defendant's counsel to acquit, that passes, in its intensity, any
professional efforts put forward in criminal trials in England, or
anywhere else that we know of.... [U]nder the cloak of worthy ends,
prosecuting officers are too prone (as instanced here) to employ those
same strenuous means for the purpose of securing a conviction, that
are known to advocates at the criminal Bar for the purpose of securing
an acquittal. The methods of either-and that of the prosecuting officer
as much as counsel for the defense-may call for present criticism.
This Court may now desire to rebuke a tendency, or to check a practice
with reference to criminal trials. But, even at that, such is a very
different thing from censuring a particular advocate for adhering to
habits and customs of the bar in that class of trials as they commonly
exist to-day.179
The intermediate appellate court judges issued three opinions.8 °
Writing for all but one of the five judges, Presiding Justice Clarke
adopted the referee's report (which in turn had adopted the City Bar's
brief) virtually wholesale. His opinion pointedly rejected any claim "that
counsel's obligation to the court of which he is an officer is any less
stringent in a criminal than in a civil case."'' 1 Justice Clarke found that
Palmieri failed to conform to the professional standards by not
correcting Annette, his own important witness, when she gave testimony
that he knew to be deliberately and knowingly false.182 The Justice also
177. Id at51.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 53-54.
180. In re Palmieri, 162 N.Y.S. 799 (App. Div. 1916), rev'd, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917).
181. Id. at803.
182. Id at 803-04.
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expressed skepticism about Palmieri's claim that he did not deliberately
elicit Annette's lies. He adopted the City Bar's argument that Palmieri
should have said to Annette "on her first statement that she had just
reached town that morning: 'Why, are you not mistaken? Did you not
come to see me yesterday?"",183 The Justice observed that Palmieri's
failure to do so "is susceptible to the inference that he knew exactly what
she was going to testify to. ' 18 4 (This, despite the fact that Annette's first
statement that she had just reached town was interrupted by an objection
that the trial judge sustained.) Justice Clarke's opinion also concluded
that there "certainly is no excuse for [Palmieri's] adopting such false
testimony in his own summing up.' ' 85
Justice Scott issued a concurring opinion joined by the other three
Justices in the majority. 186 He rejected Palmieri's ethical premises more
vehemently and condemned his conduct more harshly. First, he
dispatched with Palmieri's argument that criminal and civil litigators are
differently situated, and that the understanding expressed by Lord
Brougham, which many lawyers accepted, helps explain the difference.
Justice Scott wrote:
[T]he often-quoted dictum of Lord Brougham as to the duty which a
lawyer owes to his client, and which is cited to us by this respondent's
counsel, has been frequently misconstrued and misapplied as if it were
an authority for wrongdoing, which it distinctly is not.
There is no recognized rule of law or ethics which justifies the
conduct of counsel in any case, civil or criminal, in endeavoring by
dishonest means to mislead the court or jury even if to do so might
work to the advantage of his client. The interest of the public and the
honor of the profession alike require that counsel in a criminal case, as
well as a civil, shall employ honest methods and refrain from deceit
and chicane. In this sense I deny most emphatically that the obligations
of an attorney to the court are any different in a civil and in a criminal
case....
183. Id. at 804.
184. Id.
185. Id. (The Justice concluded, "[flor the expression of his thankfulness to God for the
intervention of Divine Providence in producing this witness, when he himself was the instigating
cause by the direct instrumentality of his client, he must be held personally responsible, as
attempting thereby to deceive the court and jury by thus solemnly ratifying her false testimony.").
186. Id. at 804, 808 (Scott, J., concurring).
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It will be difficult to find in [the Canons of Ethics] a justification
for using in behalf of an accused person unfair and dishonorable
means, such as I am convinced were used by the respondent. 187
Justice Scott then maintained that Palmieri's conduct was worse
than the City Bar alleged. Based on the documentary record, Justice
Scott was convinced that Palmieri knew from the beginning that Annette
intended to lie and he deliberately helped her along. The only open
question in Justice Scott's mind was whether Palmieri had "concocted
this scheme" in the first place. 8  No doubt someone had, he wrote,
[B]ecause it is beyond belief that the woman though[t] it out for herself
unaided and uncoached. She was a common prostitute and, as her
examination indicated, had no more education or intelligence than is
commonly found among such persons. It is inconceivable that she
should have either appreciated the necessity of accounting for her
presence in the way she undertook to do, or developed the elaborate
story to so account for it. That some one invented the story and
coached her in it I consider to be certain. I do not say that it was the
respondent, although he had ample opportunity to do so in the course
of her two visits to his residence; but, if the only charge against him
was that he instructed the Annette woman to swear falsely, it may be
that no more than a Scotch verdict [i.e., a verdict of "not proven"]
could be reached on the evidence. 189
After describing the evidence at length, Justice Scott concluded:
In my opinion, [Palmieri's] obvious helping [Annette] to lie on the
stand, and his deliberate and emphatic adoption in his summing up to
the jury of what he personally knew to be false testimony, was the
equivalent of false swearing by himself, and was precisely as
reprehensible and worthy of discipline as it would have been if he had
himself taken the stand and testified falsely. 190
Finally, in a lone dissent, Justice Page took a very different view of
the relevant ethics principles as well as the facts.' 9' Surveying the
Canons of Ethics that provided distinctive obligations for criminal and
civil litigators, he maintained:
187. Id. at 804-05.
188. Id. at 805.
189. Id. at 805-06.
190. Id. at 807.
191. Id. at 808 (Page, J., dissenting).
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The obligation of an attorney to court and client are very different
in a civil and a criminal case. In a civil case an attorney is under no
obligation to accept a retainer; in a criminal case, he may be assigned
to defend a person whom he believes to be guilty, and it is then his
duty to defend. In a civil case, if it develops in the trial of the cause
that his client has not a meritorious cause of action or defense, and that
he has been deceived by his client, and the suit is not being prosecuted
or defended in good faith, he is under an obligation to so inform the
court and withdraw from the cause. In a criminal prosecution, the
attorney having accepted a retainer, believing in his client's innocence,
he cannot withdraw even if his client confesses his guilt and demands
that the attorney continue in his defense. And, if the attorney should
inform the court of the confession, it would be a grave breach of his
duty. 192
Justice Page observed that, given the different ethical
responsibilities of a criminal defense lawyer, professional standards
announced in prior disciplinary cases arising out of civil litigation could
not "even remotely ... be considered as a precedent for" the majority's
conclusion that Palmieri had a duty to correct Annette's false
testimony. 193
If Palmieri had deliberately elicited Annette's false testimony,
Justice Page agreed, he would deserve serious condemnation, but Justice
Page found no reason to conclude that Palmieri asked questions for that
purpose, and noted that Palmieri was not formally accused by the City
Bar of having done So. 194 He disputed his brethren's conclusion that in
response to Annette's volunteered and unresponsive falsehoods on direct
examination, and even though the prosecutor then led her "into
contradictions and improbable statements which demonstrated the falsity
of her evidence,"' 95 Palmieri was professionally obligated to do more:
He left the matter, as it was, with the witness' testimony discredited,
for the triers of the fact to determine. Under the circumstances, was he
required to do more? The learned referee and the majority of the court
say, "Yes, he should have further discredited the witness by showing
on this collateral and immaterial matter that the witness had
deliberately and knowingly testified falsely." Had he done so, there
can be no doubt that it would have tended strongly to have destroyed,
in the minds of the jury, credence in her testimony on the facts in issue.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 811,813.
195. ld.at8lO.
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Yet, being false testimony as to an immaterial fact, under the rules of
law they would not have been allowed to reject her testimony as a
whole. He had not brought that fact into the case. He had presented a
witness produced by his client to substantiate his defense. He had
presented the evidence to the court. Without his solicitation the witness
had volunteered false testimony of an immaterial fact. Bearing in mind
that it was his duty to lay before the court the evidence his client
claimed proved him not guilty, irrespective of his own belief, can it be
held that he holds himself personally liable for the truth of the
testimony of the witness, even as to collateral matters, and that he must
show the falsity of such statements, or render himself liable to be
disbarred? If such a rule is to be enforced, few lawyers will dare to
defend one charged with crime. The question would constantly be
presented to their minds: Shall I betray my client, or shall I take the
risk of disbarment? 19
6
As to Palmieri's summation, Justice Page agreed that the "one
phrase" in which Palmieri thanked Divine Providence, "under the
circumstances of the case, was inexcusable" but not a deliberate
adoption of Annette's false testimony, and not worthy of anything more
than a harsh reprimand.1 97 The other four Justices saw it differently,
concluding that Palmieri had engaged in gross misconduct deserving
serious punishment. To this, viewing Palmieri's only wrong to have
occurred in the summation, Justice Page observed:
To my mind, my Brethren have adopted a stricter rule than has ever
been recognized by the courts or the profession at large.... However
writers on moral philosophy and ethics may have differed [over] time,
the legal profession have recognized the duty of the lawyer in a
criminal case to defend a client whom he knew to be guilty and to give
him the benefit of all his skill and ability in presenting the defense by
way of evidence and argumentation. Never, until this case, has the
tremendous responsibility for his utterance during a summation been
suggested or imposed.198
On December 30, 1916, reporting on the decision issued the day
before, the newspaper announced that "one of the best known attorneys
in the city" had been disbarred. 199 But Palmieri was undaunted. He
issued a statement expressing confidence that he would be exonerated:
196. Id.at810-11.
197. Id. at 811-12.
198. Id. at 812-13.
199. Ex-Justice Palmieri Disbarred by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1916, at 16.
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My side of the case has impressed at least one of the Judges of the
Appellate Division and I would therefore refer you to the opinion of
Mr. Justice Page. In addition I would mention the fact not referred to in
any of the opinions, that almost every Judge on the bench in New
York, Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond, as well as every District
Attorney of every county in the greater city, excepting, of course, the
District Attorney of the Bronx, who made the charge and who has been
hounding me for the last two years, has attested under oath to my high
standing and reputation at the bar.
I shall live to see the day when I shall be fully vindicated in the
eyes of the New York public.200
Palmieri challenged his disbarment in the state's highest court, the
Court of Appeals. His case was argued by a former judge, Nathan L.
Miller.20 1 The Bar Association's case was argued by Thomas D.
Thacher, who had recently become a partner of his father's firm and
would later go on to serve as a federal judge and United States Solicitor
202General as well as president of the City Bar.
Palmieri took a different tack in the Court of Appeals, because the
lower court's decisions had shifted the focus. Four of the five Appellate
Division panelists-Justice Scott and the three concurring in his
opinion-had gone beyond the City Bar's theory, determining that
Palmieri had deliberately elicited Annette's perjury. This, Palmieri
argued, had never been charged and was not supported by the
evidence.20 3 Thacher argued that the lower court had an alternative
ground for disbarring Palmieri, namely, his failure to correct Annette's
perjury and his fleeting reference to her false testimony; that this
wrongdoing was amply established by the evidence; and that the Court
of Appeals owed deference to the Appellate Division's sanction for this
wrongdoing. 2°4 But Palmieri argued quite plausibly that the Appellate
Division would never have imposed such a harsh sanction as disbarment
if it thought that all he had done wrong was fail to correct testimony that
was mainly elicited and thoroughly impeached by the prosecutor, and
step slightly over the line in summation.20 5
200. Id.
201. In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. 1078, 1078 (N.Y. 1917); Not a Candidate Miller Insists, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1920, at 4.
202. In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. at 1078; Dep't of Justice, Thomas D. Thacher,
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/thacher.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
203. Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 5.
204. See Respondent's Points, supra note 161, at 19-20, 27.
205. Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 43-45.
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On July 11, 1917, the court issued its decision, by a vote of three to
two, but without an opinion. With Judge Cardozo as one of the
dissenters, the court wrote simply and anticlimactically, "[o]rder
reversed, and proceedings dismissed, on the ground that the evidence
does not warrant the conclusion that there was intentional misconduct on
the part of the appellant, justifying his disbarment upon the charge
sustained by the Appellate Division.' 206 Whether the court meant that
there was no intentional misconduct at all or simply that Palmieri's
intentional misconduct did not warrant his disbarment, is unclear. The
court said nothing to resolve the disagreement about when a lawyer had
a duty to correct a witness's false testimony, how it should be corrected,
and whether a criminal defense lawyer's duty in this or other regards
differed from that of a civil litigator. It said nothing about how
disciplinary authorities and courts should evaluate circumstantial
evidence addressing a lawyer's intent and motives and where the burden
should fall on the question of whether the lawyer's purposes were
improper. We will probably never know why Judge Cardozo disagreed
with the majority, and whether his disagreement was influenced by his
own family history-by the fact that his father, a state trial judge, had
earlier been implicated in a corruption scandal that led to his resignation
(and to the creation of the City Bar).2°7
Palmieri resumed his practice. The press continued to refer to him
as "Judge," as it would do in 1927 when it reported that a bomb had
exploded at his home in Brooklyn and a threatening note left behind-
which remained an unsolved crime.20 8 Over the years, Palmieri watched
his four children grow up and his two sons become lawyers.20 9 When he
died in November 1937, his funeral was attended by Mayor Fiorello
LaGuardia, for whom his son Edmund then served as law secretary.210
206. In re Palmieri, 117 N.E. at 1078.
207. See, e.g., ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 16 (1998); Andrew L. Kaufman, The First
Judge Cardozo: Albert, Father of Benjamin, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 271, 308-10 (1994).
208. Ex-Justice Palmieri's Home is Bombed; He Blames Blackmailers Who Asked $50,000,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1927, at 1; New Threat Spurs Hunt for Bombers of Palmieri Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1927, at 1; Palmieri Buys Gun and Leaves the City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1927, at
4; Palmieri Bomb Still a Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1927, at 7. At around the same time,
Palmieri's name was in the news because a swindler posing as both Palmieri's son and an Assistant
District Attorney obtained thousands of dollars from criminal defendants and their relatives by
promising to use his connections to free the defendants from prison. Robs Convict's Mother, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1927, at 3; Arrest 'Nick the Barber', N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1927, at 25; 'Nick the
Barber'Beaten by Woman, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1927, at 3.
209. Ex-Justice Palmieri 's Home is Bombed, supra note 208.
210. Palmieri Service Held, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1937, at 25.
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At a ceremony in December 1940, after LaGuardia appointed Edmund to
serve as City Magistrate, John Palmieri's gavel was passed down to his
son, 2  who later served at length and with distinction as a federal district
judge.2t 2
VI. CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS
Does Palmieri's story have implications for how criminal defense
lawyers practice today? One way to approach this question is to consider
some of the problematic features of lawyer regulation illustrated by
Palmieri's story and to consider whether the problems still remain in one
form or another.
First, in Palmieri's day, it was unclear where the courts drew the
disciplinary lines, particularly for criminal defense lawyers. The
question on which the City Bar focused explicitly in his case was
illustrative: Did a criminal defense lawyer have to correct a witness's
false testimony when he did not intentionally elicit it and, if so, in what
manner? There were relatively few opinions sanctioning litigators, none
addressing these precise questions, and none focusing on criminal
defense lawyers in particular. The Canons of Ethics were vague and
incomplete. The lines were moving in response to the organized bar's
efforts to codify and enforce a stricter set of professional norms. The
courts were essentially making it up as they went along.213 Is it different
now? Are the lines of the law governing lawyers stable and precise?
Criminal defense lawyers, and others, still encounter many
uncertainties, as changes take place in the rules, criminal laws, nature of
law practice, and society.214 Consider the question of professional
conduct disputed in Palmieri's case. Not until the 2002 revisions to the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct did the rules state explicitly
that if a lawyer calls a witness who offers material evidence that the
211. Palmieri Gets Father's Gavel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1940, at L21.
212. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was one of Edmund Palmieri's law clerks. The Justices of
the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb.
26, 2008).
213. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 39-41 (2005) (discussing that the judicial practice of developing
standards on an ad hoc basis through judicial opinions has continued even after the courts' adoption
of formal rules).
214. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488, 498-99
(Md. 1991) ("We are conscious of the difficulty which practitioners, courts, and commentators long
have had in trying to define clearly the lines beyond which conduct becomes a disciplinary violation
in the area of client confidences.").
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lawyer knows to be false, the lawyer must "take reasonable remedial
measures," even if the lawyer did not personally offer the evidence.215 At
least until then, one might have argued that Palmieri would have had no
duty under the Model Rules to correct Annette's false testimony. He did
not "offer" the evidence on direct examination; Annette volunteered it
unresponsively and much of it was stricken upon the prosecutor's
objection. He certainly did not "offer" it on cross-examination; the
prosecutor elicited it, believing it to be false, in order to impeach
Annette. Even now, it would not be clear what "reasonable remedial
measures" a lawyer in Palmieri's position might have to take. Would it
not be enough for the lawyer to wait until closing argument, as Palmieri
did, and then acknowledge that the witness should not be believed?216
Many other uncertainties remain about the law and ethics of criminal
defense practice. Indeed, the basic question of whether to treat all
lawyers the same or to give criminal defense lawyers greater leeway
remains contested.
Second, in Palmieri's case, at least from the criminal prosecutor's
perspective, the propriety of the lawyer's conduct depended on the
resolution of witness credibility. Who was telling the truth-Annette or
Palmieri? Witnesses were susceptible to pressure to say what they
perceived the prosecutors wanted to hear. The lawyers' clients often had
an incentive to turn against their lawyers to better their own lot. The
truth might be essentially unknowable. Little has changed in that regard.
Third, particularly from the disciplinary perspective, the propriety
of Palmieri's conduct turned largely on his intent, which could only be
gleaned by drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence and
subjectively assessing his and others' credibility. As the Court of
Appeals' determination made clear, a central question was whether there
was intentional misconduct (for example, an intent by Palmieri to elicit
or exploit false testimony, both of which he denied). Even where this is
not the determinative question as to the propriety of the lawyer's
conduct, it is almost invariably central to the question of whether and
215. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2007). Thus, while a
lawyer may not intentionally elicit any "evidence that the lawyer knows to be false," a lawyer's
responsibility to remedy a witness's false testimony applies only if the false testimony was
"material." Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
216. The premise of "remedial measures" is to "undo the effect of the false evidence," so that
the court is not deceived and the truth-seeking process is not subverted. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3), R. 3.3
cmt. 10. It might therefore be argued that, even under today's standards, Palmieri had no duty




how to punish it. Think how differently Justice Scott and Justice Page
read the same record. Again, little has changed. The truth is often
unknowable and the truth-seeking process is fallible.
Fourth, in interpreting the evidence, drawing inferences, and
making credibility findings, prosecutors, disciplinary authorities, and
courts in Palmieri's day brought to the task a set of assumptions that
were socially and culturally contingent and contestable. Doubtless,
District Attorney Martin, looking across the aisle at Palmieri as a
defense lawyer, was influenced by a set of negative assumptions about
how his adversaries generally played the game. And adversaries they
surely were, as the exchanges between prosecutors and defense lawyers
made plain. Palmieri's counsel was almost facetious when complaining
about the prosecutor's breach of etiquette in dealing with "a brother
attorney. 217 The regard between defense lawyers and prosecutors was
more honestly captured by Steuer's observation that District Attorney
Martin "cares not whom he ruins. 218
Similarly, the grievance officials of the City Bar were likely
influenced by assumptions about ethnic lawyers. As Jerold Auerbach has
discussed,El9 this was a time when law licenses were sought by members
of the immigrant classes who were settling in United States cities, such
as the Irish, Italian, and eastern European Jewish immigrants who came
through Ellis Island and, in many cases, stayed in New York City.
Lawyers who came from the established classes saw the new Americans'
entry into the profession as a threat to high standards of professional
practice. 2 ° In homogenous rural communities, professional expectations
could be communicated and maintained informally, but not in the cities,
where recent arrivals and their offspring were thought to be turning the
profession of law into a business, and not an altogether savory one.
While the Italian community in New York City celebrated Palmieri, the
corporate lawyers of the City Bar probably looked down their noses at
him, viewing him as a member of a lower class of lawyers of dubious
ethics.2 l
217. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 28.
218. Raps District Attorney, supra note 146.
219. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA (1977) (examining the effects of social change in the twentieth century on the
legal profession and the response of elite lawyers).
220. Id. at 40-73.
221. So, too, gender assumptions entered the picture. Recall Justice Scott's declaration that it
was inconceivable that Annette, "a common prostitute," appreciated the need to lie about how and
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The assumptions of Palmieri's day are increasingly uncommon, if
not entirely eliminated from Wall Street law practice. But those
overseeing lawyer discipline may well be prisoners of other sets of
assumptions that, from a distance of years, will one day seem equally
dubious.
Fifth, in both the adjudicative process and the lawyer regulatory
process of Palmieri's day, criminal defense lawyers were not playing
with prosecutors on a level field. A lawyer such as Palmieri was at risk
of prosecution by his opposing counsel if he was identified too closely
with his client's or a witness's criminal conduct. The prosecutor could
not be expected to evaluate the evidence at all objectively, given the
enmity between them. Prosecutors, on the other hand, were likely to
view their own conduct more charitably. At the hearing on the Duers's
whereabouts, the judge observed that District Attorney Martin was not
above the law and was himself a potential subject of grand jury
proceedings.222 But that was not a realistic risk. Who would indict him?
He might pursue a defense lawyer for hiding a prosecution witness. But
he had no qualms about himself hiding, or even abducting, potential
witnesses.
The same imbalance continues to this day.223 Prosecutors might not
hesitate to indict criminal defense lawyers for hiding or destroying
evidence, even in contexts where both the lawyers' intent and the
relevant legal and ethical standards are unclear and highly debatable.224
But prosecutors never indict individual prosecutors for willfully
withholding or concealing discovery material from the defense, except
perhaps in the exceedingly rare case where the prosecutor in question is
a whistle-blower or otherwise has become an enemy of the people.225
when she came to New York City for the trial and dreamed up the lies herself. In re Palmieri, 162
N.Y.S. 799, 805 (App. Div. 1916) (Scott, J., concurring), rev'd, 117 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1917).
222. Writ Fails to Find Martin Witnesses, supra note 123.
223. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 327, 329-30 (1998) (discussing the interplay between criminal law and the professional norms
governing lawyer behavior).
224. See, e.g., Alison Leigh Cowan, Lawyer Admits Destroying Evidence of Pornography,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at B5 (A lawyer pled guilty to a lesser charge of misprision-"assisting
the commission of a felony by failing to report it or by concealing it"-after being indicted for
obstruction of justice for destroying a laptop containing child pornography even though the
destruction occurred before a criminal investigation was foreseeable.).
225. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Ex-Prosecutor Acquitted of Misconduct in 9/11 Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at A18 (discussing former federal prosecutor who was tried but acquitted of
withholding discovery material in a terrorism prosecution).
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Has anything changed since Palmieri's day? Certainly, the ethical
quality of both prosecution and criminal defense practice has been
elevated. There is no justification for an assumption that prosecutors,
criminal defense lawyers, or any other lawyers as a class, are engaging
in improper practices. Further, the enmity between prosecutors and
criminal defense lawyers has abated, though hardly been eliminated, at
least in New York City. But have increased respect and civility come at
a cost?
If Palmieri can be taken as representative, criminal defense lawyers
of his day were more willing to lawyer at the edge, at risk of going over
the edge and incurring whatever consequences might follow. Palmieri
evidently drank from Lord Brougham's well. He was willing to go toe-
to-toe with the prosecutor, to serve his client not only regardless of the
consequences to others, but regardless of his own self-interest. This
meant incurring not only the risk that prosecutors, grievance committees,
and courts would later look at what he believed to be proper conduct and
see it differently when they examined circumstantial evidence and
resolved credibility questions through the lens of their own assumptions;
he also incurred the risk that, in his zeal to serve his client up to the edge
of the law, he would put at least a toe over the edge, as he concededly
did in his summation. Palmieri may have felt free to take these risks, in
part, because the disciplinary process was just developing.
Things are different today. Criminal defense lawyers appear more
likely to stay far clear of the edge. And who can blame them, given the
risks created by today's far better developed set of regulatory processes?
Consider, for example, the lessons of Palmieri's experience, even
for lawyers of his own day. Yes, the Court of Appeals vindicated him, as
he predicted it would. But if he had it to do all over again, even if he
were acting with the most innocent of intentions, would he engage in the
same conduct, run the risk of a criminal prosecution and a disciplinary
prosecution, and endure the possibility that next time, the decisive three-
to-two decision would tip the other way. For what-a $250 fee that had
already been paid? Surely, the cost of his defense and the lost income, to
say nothing of the anxiety, cost many times that much. Nothing in the
Court of Appeals order reinstating him would have discouraged future
criminal prosecutors and grievance committees from proceeding the
same way in similar circumstances. And, of course, the next lawyer in
Palmieri's position might not have the resources to defend himself by
hiring a succession of top lawyers and producing testimonials from fifty
judges and public officials.
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Consequently, in the lawyer regulatory process, it is important to
think about the inter-relationship between the substantive standards
governing lawyers (established by disciplinary rules and judicial
decisions, including interpretive opinions), the legal culture, the exercise
of enforcement authority, and the courts' exercise of its sanctioning
power. These all interact with each other, for better or worse.
For example, the disciplinary rules themselves can be drafted in
ways that give more or less clarity to lawyers about how to act in a given
situation. Rules that are ambiguous or vague give less clarity. For
example, assuming Palmieri should have known that there was a duty to
correct Annette's false testimony, in what manner was he required to
correct it? The intermediate appellate court suggested he was required to
disclose through a question to her that she had met with him the previous
morning, in order to correct her false testimony that she had arrived that
morning by train. Was he also supposed to ask questions indicating that
Delane knew where she was and had summoned her to New York City?
If she denied these, was he required to stipulate to the contrary,
disclosing facts that would ordinarily be confidential?
Less clarity is also provided by rules whose application turns not on
facts that are objectively easy to ascertain, so that it is clear to all when
the rule is triggered, but on "facts" that reflect subjective judgments and
that may look very different to a regulator ex post than to a lawyer ex
ante. As Justice Stevens observed in Nix v. Whiteside,226 the
"knowledge" requirement, as in the rule forbidding a lawyer from
knowingly introducing false testimony, falls in this category. 227
Particularly when lawyers lack certainty about how to proceed in a
given case, a rule can give lawyers leeway or place them on a razor's
edge. As Fred Zacharias and I have discussed, one function of"permissive" rules of professional conduct-that is, rules that say a
lawyer "may" engage in conduct but that implicitly authorize lawyers
not to engage in the particular conduct-is to give lawyers wiggle room,
a space where they will not be disciplined no matter how they act as long
226. 475 U.S. 157, 190 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Holmes taught us that a word is but the skin of a living thought. A 'fact' may also
have a life of its own. From the perspective of an appellate judge, after a case has been
tried and the evidence has been sifted by another judge, a particular fact may be as clear
and certain as a piece of crystal or a small diamond. A trial lawyer, however, must often
deal with mixtures of sand and clay. Even a pebble that seems clear enough at first





as they act in good faith.228 For example, how should a lawyer act when
he "knows" the client intends to engage in certain criminal conduct, such
as a crime of violence? Most rules say the lawyer may disclose the
client's confidence where reasonably necessary to prevent the crime. 229
In contrast, a rule that said the lawyer must report the client's intent
where reasonably necessary to prevent the crime, if strictly enforced,
would put the lawyer in an almost impossible situation: If a regulator
decided that in hindsight, disclosure was not reasonably necessary, the
disclosing lawyer could be disciplined for breaching the confidence; if
the regulator decided the opposite, then the nondisclosing lawyer could
be disciplined for failing to report.230
In the case of the standard advocated by the City Bar-namely, that
a lawyer must correct testimony that he "knows" is false-a lawyer is
similarly on a razor's edge. It is clear in hindsight that Palmieri knew
Annette was lying, since he met with her at a time when she claimed to
be upstate. But if "knowledge" means something other than firsthand
knowledge, then a lawyer will sometimes be unsure what he does and
does not "know." If the lawyer corrects the witness when he strongly
suspects but does not know her testimony is false, he is undermining the
client's case and, thus, acting unethically; if he does know her testimony
is false, given how the information he possesses is later viewed by
others, but remains silent, thinking that he had merely a strong suspicion
but not knowledge, he has violated a different standard. There is no
room for error. Palmieri was on a razor's edge in a different respect,
because of uncertainty about how to correct the witness's false
testimony. If he went too far, he would be violating his confidentiality
duty and violating his duty of zealous advocacy; if he did not provide
sufficient correction, he would be violating his duty of candor to the
court.
With respect to unclear standards of conduct, courts can create
greater clarity. They can do so in opinions interpreting disciplinary rules
23113in the context of litigation or in advisory opinions.232 They can also be
228. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91
MtNN. L. REV. 265, 300 (2006).
229. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007).
230. See, e.g., Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a Lawyer
Fails to Warn a Third Party of a Client's Threat to Cause Serious Physical Harm or Death, 36
IDAHO L. REV. 479,495 & n. 102 (2000).
231. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers
in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 497-99
(1996) (discussing adjudication, rather than rule-making, as a means of clarifying disciplinary
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more precise when they issue opinions establishing standards of conduct
for lawyers through their exercise of their general supervisory
authority.233 In general, however, courts have preferred the flexibility
that comes with preserving a certain level of vagueness and ambiguity in
the disciplinary rules and sanction opinions-hence rules such as those
forbidding "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.' ,234 Such provisions enable judges to sweep in conduct that was
not anticipated when the rules were drafted but that later seems
deserving of condemnation, especially when it is fair to say that a lawyer
should have known better even without explicit notice. Vagueness also
preserves the appearance that the disciplinary rules are rules of "ethics,"
codifying general standards that reflect commonly understood
professional understandings about right and wrong, rather than
somewhat arbitrary regulatory standards like the tax code. Vague rules
also limit the amount of judgments that judges must make on the front-
end (that is, in rule-making as opposed to adjudication), allow decisions
to be made in concrete cases after an adversarial presentation, and enable
judges to issue factually nuanced opinions that might be hard to codify.
But, of course, uncertainty comes at a price, as the relevant expectations
may not be as clear for lawyers as courts later suppose they were, and
lawyers may refrain from acceptable and useful conduct to avoid
crossing unclear boundaries.
The relationship between the substantive standard of conduct and
fact-finding becomes important when the relevant "fact," such as
whether a lawyer "knew" that a witness's testimony was false, is not
readily ascertainable, because the "fact" is not objectively determinable.
Procedural devices such as the burden of proof become significant to
how lawyers will behave ex ante in light of the uncertainty. If the fact,
such as the lawyer's knowledge, must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence, the lawyer will be less timid than if it may be established only
by a preponderance of the evidence.
rules); see also Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound. The Intersection of the Ethical
Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REv. 687, 710-16 (1991) (discussing need to clarify
disciplinary rules where the bounds are set by criminal law).
232. See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 731, 742 (2002) (discussing New Jersey Supreme Court's selective review of ethics
advisory opinions).
233. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1303 (2003) (analyzing federal
courts' authority to regulate lawyers through the exercise of supervisory authority).
234. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2007).
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When relevant rules and facts are unclear, the legal culture,
enforcement policies, and sanctioning practices also become important.
Understandings derived from the legal culture may fill in gaps in the
rules and influence how lawyers act in areas of ambiguity.235 The
cultural understandings about a criminal defense lawyer's role, for
example, may encourage greater risk-taking in pursuit of the client's
interests or greater caution. Courts have a role in influencing the legal
culture-as, no doubt, the various Appellate Division opinions in
Palmieri's case aimed to do. At the same time, courts may or may not
accommodate the legal culture as it exists at any point in time.
The nature of enforcement policies and sanctioning practices
becomes particularly important both when the meaning of the rules is
unclear and when the relevant facts are unclear, especially when the
legal culture of the time encourages risk-taking. Criminal prosecutors
and grievance committees might refrain from bringing close cases, as a
way of acknowledging the legitimacy of lawyering at the edge and the
attendant risk of lawyering over the edge when the relevant substantive
standards are unclear or do not provide discretion so that lawyers have
room for error.236 In such cases, courts might issue opinions
prospectively,237 appreciating the penalty that even a seemingly light
sanction, such as a public reprimand, imposes on conscientious lawyers
who are jealous of their professional reputation.
Is there a lesson here for regulatory authorities-prosecutors,
disciplinary officials, and courts? Perhaps there is a lesson about the
need to be sensitive to the tension between our profession's normative
standards and traditions, which encourage criminal defense lawyers to be
zealous advocates right up to the edge, and the regulatory processes,
which push risk-averse lawyers in the opposite direction. Often, the
regulatory authorities' rhetoric is not very sympathetic: If anyone should
know what is expected of them, they say, it is lawyers; if anyone should
235. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 19 (1997) (exploring the relationship between a lawyer's
personal values and their professional conduct); Bruce A. Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique,
21 J. L. & RELIGION 283, 285-87 (2006) (recognizing that "religious values, commitments and
identities" may be relevant to lawyers' professional conduct with respect to professional norms that
are "incomplete and capacious").
236. See generally Green, supra note 223 (noting that prosecuting lawyers for violations of
unclear standards of conduct may result in over-criminalization).
237. Palmieri suggested this, citing a nineteenth century federal decisions in which United
States Supreme Court Justice Miller declined to sanction a Colorado lawyer (and future United
States Senator) for witness tampering when the conduct in question was not clearly improper under
the understandings of the time. Brief for Respondent, supra note 68, at 51-53.
[Vol. 36:353
CRIMINAL LA WYERING AT THE EDGE
abide by the law, it is lawyers; the rules apply the same way to all
lawyers. But this fails to take account of the blurriness of the legal and
ethical lines and the fallibility of fact findings, both of which encourage
risk-averse lawyers to temper their advocacy, avoiding conduct that they
believe is lawful and that may well be, but that may be construed
differently by prosecutors, disciplinary authorities, and courts. In some
regulatory areas, we have no concern about telling people to stay well
back from the edge and about punishing them when they stray over it.
But legal representation, particularly on behalf of a criminal defendant,
is an area where over-deterrence comes at a cost.
I have suggested in the past that lawyers, and particularly criminal
defense lawyers, are different and should be treated differently in the
criminal justice process.238 The same may be true, although perhaps less
so, in the disciplinary process. Maybe criminal defense lawyers need to
be cut some slack, in order to revivify an idea of "zealous[] [advocacy]
within the bounds of the law" 239 that places as much emphasis on
zealous advocacy as on the legal bounds. That may be what the Court of
Appeals thought it was doing in Palmieri's case. Perhaps close to a
century later it is time for courts to make the point more explicitly.
238. Green, supra note 223, at 385-92.
239. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (2007).
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